The Right to Language Use in South African Criminal Courts by Cote, David
  
 
 
The Right to Language Use in South African 
Criminal Courts 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by: David Cote (CTXDAV001) 
Submitted for: Research Dissertation for Master of Laws (LL.M.) 
with Specialisation in Criminal Justice 
Supervisor: Prof. Anashri Pillay 
Date Submitted: 30 August 2005 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of the 
requirements for the Master of Laws (LL.M.) in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion 
of a programme of courses.  
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of Master of Laws (LL.M.) dissertations, including those relating to length 
and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation 
conforms to those regulations.  
 1
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction……………………………………….……………………………….p. 3 
Brief History of the Development of Language in the Courtroom……..................p. 5 
South African Law: the Constitution……………………………………………....p. 8 
South African Law: the Statutes………………………………………..................p. 13 
South African Case-Law……………………………………………….................p. 15 
Language Rights in International Law…………………………………................p. 35 
Language Rights in Foreign Jurisdictions…………………………………….….p. 38  
Interpretation in South African Courtrooms………………………………….….p. 42 
Practicability in the Language Provisions of the Constitution…………..............p. 47 
English as the Sole Language of Record…………………………………………p. 49 
Conclusions and Recommendations…………………………………….............p. 52 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………….............p. 54 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 2
Introduction 
For the average person, confrontation with the criminal justice system is a frightening 
experience.  Most people enter a courtroom with little or no knowledge of their rights.  
Courtroom procedures are complicated and beyond most people’s experience.   
The situation is exacerbated when the court actors are speaking in a language that the 
accused does not understand or does not understand well.  This is often the case for 
people who stand accused in a South African courtroom where the majority of accused 
do not speak the language of the court, but are rather speakers of the country’s 
indigenous languages.   
 
Just over 12 years ago, the languages of the court were officially Afrikaans and 
English.  South Africa’s transition to constitutional democracy, however, has changed 
the linguistic obligations on the government and its organs, including the judiciary.   
After over 10 years of democratic rule and this change of the legal status of the 
country’s indigenous African languages, has there been a change in the way language is 
used in South Africa’s criminal courts?  Has the constitutionally proscribed right of 
“parity of esteem” and equal treatment1 been respected by a judiciary that is by and 
large composed of speakers of the two former sole official languages?2  And finally, 
are the courts an appropriate place to promote languages rights or is language use in 
court a basic right to communication rather than cultural expression? 
 
In order to fully understand the use of languages in criminal court, I will begin with a 
brief history of government’s treatment of languages in the South African context.  This 
will give a backdrop to understanding the challenges facing the government today.  
Next, I will summarize the obligations imposed by the Constitution as well as the 
various pieces of South African legislation dealing with language use in court.   Using 
this analysis as a base, I will then take the reader through the case-law that has been 
developing around these obligations and the interpretation given to them by magistrates 
and judges in various parts of the country.  As will be seen, there are regional 
differences to how languages are used in the reality of the country’s courtrooms.   
                                                 
1  Section 6(4) Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
2  SAfm Radio Transcript, “Language of Justice” Interview with Judge President of the Cape High 
Court J.M. Hlophe. Broadcast date: 29 October 2003. Transcript accessed online: 
www.safm.co.za/transcripts/index.jsp?transcriptid=4054
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Following this analysis, I will then examine language provisions under international 
law.  These provisions are not necessarily binding on South Africa, but give an 
indication of how international organizations, which for obvious reasons work in a 
multi-lingual environment, have been interpreting cultural rights as opposed to 
communication rights.  A similar analysis will then be made of foreign jurisdictions and 
their use of language rights in court.  A look at Canadian case-law allows a comparison 
with the provisions in the South African Bill of Rights as the two legal regimes share 
many similarities, but not necessarily the same outcomes.  A brief look at other 
jurisdictions, such as India, China and Malawi, dealing with the realities of a multi-
lingual environment coupled with scarce resources may help South African officials in 
finding solutions to the problems in this country.   
 
The next section will deal with the use of interpreters in the courtroom.  This is an old 
tradition in South African courts, but one which has added complications to an already 
overaught criminal justice system.  These issues of practicality are further explored 
with the following section on the practicability and the Constitution.  The language 
provisions in the Bill of Rights are often limited by practicability clauses imbedded in 
the section.  I will examine the various components of practicability and the way they 
have been interpreted by courts around the country.   
 
Lastly, I will look at one suggestion that has been proposed not only by courts, but 
government officials as well.  This would be to make one language of record for all 
South African courts.  I will look at the constitutionality of such as proposal and 
whether it is appropriate within the broader lines of reconciliation and the requirement 
to advance the use of indigenous languages as imposed by the Constitution.  The final 
part will then finish with conclusions and recommendations for the use of languages in 
criminal court in both the short and long term.   
 
The South African government had bestowed upon it a great challenge when generous 
language provisions were included in the country’s Constitution.  It remains to be seen, 
however, if it can meet the challenges that have been set out within the practical 
confines of its resources and its actors.   
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1. Brief History of the Development of Language in the Courtroom 
In order to understand the debates about language in court, it is necessary to understand 
the context of language in law and the role it has played and continues to play in the 
shaping of the South African political and historical culture.   
 
Before the arrival of European settlers, the indigenous African populations lived under 
complex, though unwritten, bodies of law.3  Peoples identified themselves through 
various traits, one of the most important being language.  When the first settlers of the 
Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) arrived at the Cape in 1652, they imported a 
written body of law as well as the Dutch language.  Throughout the V.O.C. rule, Dutch 
and its local derivative, the fledgling Afrikaans, became the dominant language in the 
execution and administration of that law.4
 
The exclusive use of these languages was threatened by the British conquest of the 
Cape and its subsequent annexation in 1806.  British administrators brought not only 
their law, but imposed their language on the administration of the colony, including the 
courts.  This was to set the stage for the linguistic “bellum juridicum” that would 
dominate South African legal history until the early 1990’s.5  
 
After the establishment of the independent states of the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal in the 1850’s, the language of the Dutch settlers began to develop in earnest, 
leading even to the publication of texts in their parlance rather than the more formal 
Dutch language.6  The Anglo-Boer War brought an end to the independence of these 
states, but the people, who now referred to themselves as Afrikaners, retained a sense of 
nationalism that would lead them to take great measures to protect and develop their 
identity, especially with regards to their language.  In the negotiations that led to the 
Union of South Africa Act of 1910, a joint submission was introduced and accepted by 
the British government making both English and Dutch official languages of the 
country.7  The subsequent Official Languages of the Union Act 8 of 1925 included 
                                                 
3  LOUBSER, Max, “Linguistic Factors into the Mix: The South African Experience of Language and 
the Law,” Tulane Law Review, December 2003, p. 111. 
4  Op cit. ftn 3, p. 112. 
5  Op cit. ftn 3., p. 115.  
6  Op cit. ftn 3, p. 140. 
7  RENSBURG, MALHERBE, and LANDMAN (Friday Group), “Do We Really Mean 
Multilingualism?” Accessed through www.groep63.org.za/opstelle.htm; and  
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Afrikaans as part of the Dutch Language.  The 1961 Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 32 of 1961 reversed the importance and made Dutch as part of the 
Afrikaans language while the 1983 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 
1983 made no mention of Dutch at all.  The importance of the protection of the 
Afrikaans language is revealed by the special procedures set in place for repealing these 
language provisions.8   
 
Throughout the twentieth century, considerable efforts on the part of the Afrikaans-
speaking community fueled by an anti-imperialist sentiment led to a concerted 
development of the Afrikaans language.  This was especially true in the area of law.  
Afrikaans language schools were established in Stellenbosch and Pretoria and by 1937, 
there was an Afrikaans language law journal being published.9 The election of the 
Nationalist Party in 1948 saw the increase in the use of Afrikaans in the public sector.  
As the state grew, so did the use and support of the language to the point where it had 
developed into a fully-fledged legal language.   
 
Unfortunately, the African languages of South Africa did not receive the same 
attention.  It was not until the 1993 “Interim Constitution” (Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act 200 of 1993) that African indigenous languages were given any 
official recognition as languages of the state.10  The realities of a multilingual South 
Africa could not be ignored, even by former euro-centric colonial and post-colonial 
regimes.  Statutes such as the Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1944 created obligations for 
courts to find appropriate interpretation for accused persons who appeared to not 
understand the language of the Court.11  Rules of the High Court12 as well as the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 both contain dispositions for the use and translation 
of testimony and documents in indigenous languages in courts.  Normally, these 
provisions ensure that evidence and testimony is translated into what were the two 
official languages of the Republic, English and Afrikaans.  But there was no interest in 
                                                                                                                                            
Op cit. ftn 14, p. 548. 
8  Op cit. ftn 3, p 114 and 123; and 
    Op cit. ftn 14, p. 548. 
9  Op cit. ftn 3, p. 115. 
10 Op cit. ftn 3, p. 144. 
11  CASSIM, Fawzia, “The Right to Address the Court in the Language of One’s Choice,” Codillus 
XLIV No/Nr 2, p. 25: Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, s. 6(2) (as reported in article).  
12  Op cit. ftn 3, p. 146. 
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developing these languages for use in government until the 1950’s.  It was at this time 
that the government began to implement its “Homelands” scheme in which areas of the 
country would become “independent” and self-governing.  It was expected that the 
indigenous languages of each tribal group would become the language of government 
for each homeland area.13
 
By the time the struggle against apartheid has reached the point of negotiations in the 
early 1990’s, language had played an extremely important part in the development of 
the liberation movement’s struggle towards democracy.  One of the pinnacle moments 
of the struggle was the Soweto uprisings which put the situation in South Africa in the 
eye of the international community and saw a violent turn in the various movements.  
One of the main catalysts for this uprising was the decision by the government to 
impose schooling in Afrikaans on Black students.14  This negative view of Afrikaans 
has led to its diminished use by government and the public sector.15
 
The constitutional negotiations and the subsequent draft Constitutions that were created 
were governed by a set of Constitutional Principles which were to be respected before 
the Constitutional Court would accept a final draft.  Principle XI sought the protection 
and promotion of language and culture.16  This principle influenced the provisions of 
the Constitution today, both those provisions within as well as those outside the gambit 
of the Bill of Rights.   
 
With an understanding of the historical background of the numerous language issues in 
South African history, we will now move on and examine the various protections of 
language rights, both in the Constitution as well as the national statutes and various 
international conventions to which South Africa is party.   
 
 
                                                 
13  RENSBURG, MALHERBE, and LANDMAN (Friday Group), “Do We Really Mean 
Multilingualism?” Accessed through www.groep63.org.za/opstelle.htm, p. 35; and 
      Op cit., ftn 52, p. 59. 
14  CHEADLE, DAVIS and HAYSOM, “South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights,” 
Butterworths, Durban, 2002, p. 548. 
15  BARKER, Harry, “Language in the Courts: English – the Unifying Medium?” De Rebus Article, 
October 1998. 
16   Op cit. ftn 14, p. 549. 
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2.   South African Law and Case-Law 
a) South African Law: The Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes it very clear that it is the 
supreme law of the land: “… law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the 
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”17  As such, it is within the context of 
Constitutional guarantees and obligations that all statutes and case-law in South Africa 
must be examined.  This is equally true for the conduct of state agents, including 
members of the criminal justice system.   
 
Found among the Founding Provisions of Chapter I of the Constitution is Section 6 
which deals with the question of languages.  Section 6 (1) lists the eleven official 
languages of South Africa.  Of the eleven, nine are indigenous African languages.  The 
other two, English and Afrikaans are essentially European languages in both their 
structure as well as their treatment by previous colonial and post-colonial regimes.18  
This interpretation of “indigenous languages” is emboldened by a study of s. 6(2).  This 
section seeks to recognize the “historically diminished use and status of the indigenous 
languages of our people” as well as create an obligation on the state to take “practical 
and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages.”19  
The use of the word “practical” in this section is important as it also accompanies the 
other Constitutional provisions regarding language rights and has been key to many of 
the judgments that have dealt with language rights, particularly in the context of the 
criminal justice system. 
 
The next subsection structures the use of language by the national government, the 
provincial governments as well as the language needs of the country’s municipalities.20  
Once again, when governments are determining which language to use, they are given a 
                                                 
17  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, s. 2. 
18  There is debate about whether Afrikaans should be considered an indigenous language due to the 
fact that it developed independently and apart from its Dutch ancestor through the influence of its use 
in Africa: 
     Op cit. ftn 3, p. 141 
     Op cit ftn 15. 
For the purposes of this paper which seeks to examine the legal issues regarding language use in 
criminal courts, the term “indigenous languages of South Africa” means the nine official languages 
listed in s. 6(1) of the Constitution, if one excludes English and Afrikaans.  Although many Africans 
languages are spoken in South Africa, to include them in the above term would require a change in the 
text of s. 6(1).   
19  S. 6(2) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996. 
20  S. 6(3)(a)(b) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996.  
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number of criteria to take into account.  Among these criteria are “usage, practicality, 
expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs and preferences of the 
population as a whole or in the province concerned.”21  It should be noted that 
“practicality” stands alone from usage, expense and regional circumstances.  This will 
be further explored in the section on practicality below.   
 
Another subsection that has played an important role in the interpretation of language 
rights in court has been s. 6(4).  This subsection requires that the national and 
provincial governments monitor their use of official languages.  But the subsection 
further provides that “(w)ithout detracting from the provisions of subsection (2), all 
official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equitably.”22  This 
provision that all official languages must be treated equitably has as its only 
qualification that this guarantee of equity may not prevent the practical and positive 
measures that the state must take to “elevate the status and advance the use of” 
indigenous languages that have been historically disadvantaged by years of colonial and 
white-minority rule.  It is thus easy to see how issues of practicality have become so 
pivotal in the debate surrounding language rights in court and especially of the policy 
of making English the sole language of record in South African courts.  This will be 
further discussed below.   
 
The final subsection to s. 6 provides for the creation of a Pan-South African Language 
Board.  This Board is given the responsibility of promoting and developing the 
country’s official languages as listed in s. 6(1) as well as the Khoi, Nama and San 
languages, truly indigenous in their own right, and sign language.23  The Board also has 
the job of promoting and ensuring respect for languages that have cultural significance 
for communities in South Africa, such as German, Greek, Hindi and Urdu as well as 
religious significance such as Arabic, Hebrew and Sanskrit.24  In all, 26 languages are 
enumerated for protection and promotion by the language board, but it should be noted 
that this is not at all a closed list.  S. 6(5)(b)(ii) is worded in very broad terms and 
denotes a fundamental respect for language use in this country.   
 
                                                 
21  S. 6(3)(a) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996.   
22  S. 6(4) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996. 
23  S. 6(5)(a)(i)(ii)(iii) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996. 
24  S. 6(5)(b)(i)(ii) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996. 
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A superficial examination of s. 6 of the Founding Provisions of the Constitution would 
lead one to feel confident that all of the official languages are to be protected and their 
use promoted under the new constitutional regime in South Africa.  Later provisions are 
language rights, however, are far less generous and the interpretation of these rights has 
not lived up to the promise of its wording.   
 
The Bill of Rights, the “cornerstone of democracy in South Africa,”25 contains a 
number of provisions regarding the protection of language and the daily needs that one 
might have for their use.  Section 29(2) provides that everyone has the rights to receive 
education in the official language(s) of their choice, but this right is qualified by 
reasonable practicability.  Practicability is used again as a criteria that the state must 
take into account when looking at educational alternatives.  Section 30 states that 
everyone has the right to use the language of their choice as long as such use is 
consistent with the provisions of the Bill of Right.  This right is not limited to official 
languages, but is subject to both it’s “internal qualifier” as well as the s. 36 limitations 
clause which delineates the circumstances inn which the rights contained in the Bill 
may be limited in an open and democratic society.26  It is important to note that s. 6 is 
not subject to the limitations clause and may only be limited by its own internal 
qualifiers and the fundamental ideals of the Constitution.   
 
Section 31 gives persons belonging to cultural, religious and linguistic communities the 
right to enjoy their culture, religion and language as well as the right to form and 
maintain associations formed around these activities.  This section also contains the 
internal qualifier which limits this right to activities consistent with the Bill.   
 
Of particular importance to this paper are the rights contained in s. 35 of the Bill of 
Rights, and more specifically, s. 35(3) which give an open-ended list of the rights 
necessary for a “fair trial.”  Section 35(3)(k) provides that: “Every accused person has a 
right to a fair trial, which includes the right – to be tried in a language that the accused 
person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in 
that language.”27  This section has been examined by a number of cases which will be 
                                                 
25  S. 7(1) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996. 
26  Op cit. ftn 14, p. 549. 
27  S. 35(3)(k) Constitution Act, 108 of 1996. 
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studied in the next chapter.  Suffice it to say, there are a number of aspects to this 
provision which can be quickly reviewed in order to better understand the case-law.  
One such issue is derived from the wording of the subsection.  This section guarantees 
the right of the accused to be tried “in a language that the accused person understands.”  
In South Africa, as with many jurisdictions around the world, this has been interpreted 
as a right to a trial, not necessarily in first language or languages of the accused, but 
rather in a language in which the accused person understands.28  As already mentioned, 
this decision is in line with other jurisdictions that have similar wording and provision 
for the language used in court.29  The context for these decisions is the debate about 
whether the right to language use in court is perceived as a language right and therefore 
a cultural right protected by the Bill of Rights as well as a number of international 
conventions, or merely a right to communication which would imply a right to a fair 
trial30 and need not invoke cultural rights.31  This appears to be the interpretation that 
has thus far been relied upon in courts.  This trend, however, may be changing as can 
be seen by a recent South African judgment, S v. Pienaar32 which was heavily 
influenced by the changing tide in Canadian jurisprudence regarding the respect of 
language and cultural rights in the court setting.  
  
This interaction between language rights vs. communication rights in South African 
and international case-law will be explored more in depth in the following section.  It is 
hoped, however, that the particular circumstances of the South African legal system 
may lead to an expanded use of the courts as a place for cultural and linguistic 
development.   
 
Another important element of s. 35(3)(k) is once again the use of practicability test for 
language rights.  This test is a change from the wording in the equivalent section of the 
Interim Constitution which stated that an accused person had the right to “be tried in a 
language which he or she understands or, failing this, to have the proceedings 
                                                 
28  Mthethwa v. De Bruin NO and Another 1998 (3) BCLR 336 (N), p. 338. 
29  Guesdon v. France, Communications No. 219/1986, UN Doc A/45/40 Vol. 2 (1990); and 
 Yves Cadoret and Hervé Le Behan v France, Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement 
40 (A/46/40), Nos 221/1987 and 323/1988 as reported in CASSIM, p. 29. 
30  Op cit. ftn 14, p. 554. 
31  Op cit. ftn 11, p. 28. 
32  S v. Pienaar 2000 (2) SACR 143 (NC). 
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interpreted to him or her,”33 where the term “failing this” threatened to cause confusion 
in interpretation.  This term has been replaced with the idea of practicability in s. 
35(3)(k).  The test is invoked when the court determines that it is not “practicable” to 
try the accused in a language that he or she understands.  If the test is successful, the 
accused then has a right to have the proceedings interpreted into a language that he or 
she understands.  Some judges have seen this as a right to have the proceedings 
interpreted into the accused person’s official language of choice,34 however that would 
no doubt be subject to a practicability test depending on the language requested.   
 
As will be seen in the case-law, judges have had difficulty in justifying when it is 
impractical to conduct a trial in any language other than English or Afrikaans.  As it 
stands now, English and Afrikaans are the only two languages of record in South 
African courts.  Courts have begrudgingly accepted the Constitutional right to conduct 
trials in other indigenous languages, but have called for a sole language of record to be 
introduced in order to reduce the “impracticalities” that a multilingual justice system 
would create.35  Often, courts use the linguistic make-up of the judiciary as justification 
for only using English and Afrikaans as the languages of record.  A major point of 
concern is that trials which result in automatic reviews or appeals will be costly and 
could result in delays for the accused due to translation services necessary for the 
majority of the Bench who are currently mostly Afrikaans and English-speaking with 
little or no knowledge of indigenous African languages.36   
 
The change in trend seen in Pienaar where it was decided that the accused person has 
the right to a trial in his or her own official language not only relied on the right to use 
and promote one’s language, but also referred to the practical problems stemming from 
the use of interpreters in court.37  There has been significant study done on the impact 
of the dependence on interpreters in criminal courts, particularly where there is a high 
number of unrepresented accused.  There exists the danger of interpreters being given 
and accepting additional roles in a courtroom that may tend to compromise their role as 
                                                 
33  S. 25(3)(i) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993; and 
     Op cit. ftn 38, p. 359. 
34  Mthethwa, p. 338. 
35  S v. Matomela, 1998 (3) BCLR 339 (Ck). 
36  Matomela, p. 342; and 
    Op. cit., ftn 2. 
37 Pienaar, para 17 et ss. 
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an unbiased mouthpiece for the actors in court.  This phenomenon and its subsequent 
problems will be studied further in the section on Interpretation in the Courtroom. 
 
Finally, s. 34(4) states that information given to a person and not necessarily an 
accused, must be given in a language that the person understands.  This includes 
effectively informing an accused person, for example, of rights upon arrest in which the 
right also includes informing the accused person38 or in effectively communicating the 
charge against him or her.39   
 
As seen through a glance of the dispositions in the Constitution relating to the use as 
well as the right to use language, the generous provisions of s. 6 are tempered by the 
concerns over practicality in the subsequent guarantees.  This is especially true for s. 
35(3)(k) where issues over practicality concerns have allowed for a situation where the 
pre-1994 privileged status of English and Afrikaans as the only languages in the 
country’s courtrooms to continue.  Practicality concerns have spawned a movement 
towards the establishment of English as the sole language of record, thereby increasing 
the need for court interpreters.  
 
We will now study the evolution of South African case-law regarding this issue to see 
the evolution of these debates and the direction in which both the judiciary and the 
legislature may take the question of language in court.   
 
b) South African Law: The Statutes 
As stated earlier, language has had an important place in the development of the South 
African criminal justice system.  Statutes and Rules of the Court have long recognized 
the multilingual reality of the court system.  Since 1993, these statutes have been 
modified and reinterpreted with the values and imperatives of the Constitution in mind.  
Therefore, despite numerous references to the two official languages of South Africa in 
various statutes, there is no reason to believe that these dispositions remain limited to 
English and Afrikaans,40 even if they remain so in practice.41   
                                                 
38 STEYTLER, Nico, “Constitutional Criminal Procedure,” Butterworths, Durban, 1998, p. 119. 
39 Op cit. ftn 38, p. 230. 
40  Op cit. ftn 3, p. 146. 
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The Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 provides for the provision of an interpreter if, 
in the opinion of the court, the accused is not sufficiently conversant in the language in 
which evidence is being given.42  This section is applicable irrespective of whether the 
representative of the accused understands the language spoken or not.  It is interesting 
to note that the onus is put on the court not only to provide the interpreter, but also to 
determine whether the accused is sufficiently conversant in the language of the court.  
The court is also responsible to determine whether the accused “appears” sufficiently 
conversant in the language in which the interpreter is interpreting.  This puts the onus 
on the magistrate to provide a proper and competent interpreter for the accused.  Failure 
to do so can result in an irregularity of the trial.43
 
One aspect of this Act that has been examined in case-law has been the meaning of a 
“competent” interpreter.  As mentioned above, the magistrate has the responsibility to 
provide a competent interpreter if the accused appears not to be sufficiently conversant.  
Therefore, an interpreter who does not appear to understand the language that the 
accused understands is not competent to act for him.  The principle is that the accused 
must be able to understand the proceedings at all times.44  This principle may appear to 
be simple, but there are many circumstances in which this irregularity may manifest 
itself to produce a faulty interpretation and thus breach the accused’s rights to a fair 
trial.  Such circumstances range from an interpreter’s blatant inability to speak a certain 
                                                                                                                                            
41  MOEKETSI, R.H., “Redefining the Role of the South African Court Interpreter,” Newsletter of the 
National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, Vol. 8, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Fall, 
1999; and 
    Op cit. ftn 38: 
     In Steytler’s text “Constitutional Criminal Procedure,” the author states that because English and 
Afrikaans were the designated languages of record and that all laws passed before 1996 were still valid 
unless subsequently modified and therefore English and Afrikaans are still the languages of record.  It 
is then submitted that a) the wording of the statute refers to “either of the official languages” when 
addressing the court and recording the proceedings, and “either” could easily be grammatically 
replaced with “any” when referring to more than two languages as is now the case, and b) the decision 
in S v. Matomela acknowledged the constitutional right of the court to decide to proceed in a language 
other than English and Afrikaans.  
42  Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944,  Section 6(2) reads: 
“If, in a criminal case, evidence is given in a language with which the accused is not in the 
opinion of the court sufficiently conversant, a competent interpreter shall be called by the 
court in order to translate such evidence into a language with which the accused professes 
or appears to the court to be sufficiently conversant, irrespective of whether the language in 
which the evidence is given, is one of the official languages or of whether the representative 
of the accused in conversant with the language used in evidence or not.” 
43  S v. Abrahams 1997 (2) SACR 47 (C) 
44  Abrahams, p. 49. 
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language,45 to an improper swearing-in of ad hoc interpreters,46 to an interpreter’s 
incompetency due to inebriation.47 It is worth noting that s. 6(2) Magistrates’ Courts 
Act only applies to criminal proceedings and does not obligate the magistrate in civil 
matters.  
 
One of the difficulties that arise from a multilingual system for records is the prospect 
of automatic review in the Criminal Procedure Act.48  One of the concerns raised in 
Matomela, in which the judge in obiter suggested that the Department of Justice should 
adopt a sole language of record, is that for matters that are subject to review, the time 
necessary to properly translate the record as well as additional documents necessary for 
the judges that do not speak the language of record for that case.49  As the judge in 
Mthethwa pointed out, it becomes impractical to review cases in a language other than 
English or Afrikaans (for example, isiZulu in this case), because at that moment, there 
was only one High Court judge who was sufficiently fluent in isiZulu to understand the 
record, and a review requires at least two judges.50  These concerns have been among 
the most hotly debated and will be seen in more depth in the following section.  
 
c) South African Case-Law 
 As language issues have always been important to the historical and political 
make-up of South Africa, it is not surprising that case-law on this issue goes deep into 
the history of the legal system.  The imposition of Dutch on the local indigenous people 
causes enormous difficulties amplified by the tense relations already experienced by the 
different parties concerned.  After the British conquest of the Cape Colony, the Dutch 
and those speaking the Cape variant of Dutch, did their best to ensure that their 
language would not be assimilated or neglected.  The legal provisions subsequently 
provided to the Dutch language became another source of contention which the courts 
were delegated to decide.51  The subsequent development of Afrikaans into a fully 
                                                 
45  S v. Ngubane 1995 (1) SACR 384 (T) 
46  S v. Ndala 1996 (2) SACR 218 (C); and 
     S v. Siyotula 2003 (1) SACR 154 (E) 
47  S v. Swarbooi [2003] JOL 11461 (E) 
48  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s. 302 et ss.  
49  Mthethwa, p. 338. 
50  Mthethwa, p. 338. 
51  Queen v. Wetton (1885-1906) 2 Buch AC 71: A decision of the Court of Appeal regarding an 1885 
judgment from the Aliwal North Circuit Court where the Appeals Court refused to quash an 
indictment written in English only, but allowed the accused to object to being tried until he had 
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fledged legal language in the 20th century and the protections afforded it in the various 
Constitutions throughout that time gave it a protection within the system itself.  
However, as noted above, the African indigenous languages were left under-developed 
in the absence of government support or use.  They are now in a position that requires 
modernization and promotion.52
 
The advent of the Final Constitution in 1996 has created an opportunity for such 
advancement.  Some authors have even called it a constitutional requirement.53  How 
have the courts reacted to this opportunity?  As we have seen from the above section, 
despite the generous provisions in statutes and Constitutional guarantees, practicalities 
may stand in the way of this progress. A review of a selection of the jurisprudence from 
the country’s High Courts reveals how the debate has evolved under the Constitution.  
 
In a 1993 judgment, decided without the use of a Bill of Rights, the judge of the 
Transvaal High Court decided in S v. Lesaena54 that although fair trial provisions and 
the Magistrates’ Courts Act require an interpreter if the accused is unable, in the 
magistrate’s opinion, to understand the language of the court, an interpreter cannot be 
forced on an accused who wishes and is able to use that language.55  During a trial 
involving the Road Traffic Act, the accused had applied for Legal Aid but was refused 
and therefore decided to defend himself.56  When the defendant began to cross-examine 
a state witness, the magistrate had to clarify the defendant’s question to the witness.  
The accused then answered the magistrate’s question in Afrikaans (the language of 
record for that court).  He was then told to speak through the interpreter.57  When it 
came time for his own testimony, he again asked if he could speak Afrikaans, but the 
magistrate again told him to speak through the interpreter.58  The High Court judge 
decided that the right to an interpreter for a fair trial does not create an obligation to use 
                                                                                                                                            
been serviced with the indictment and notice of trial in both English and Dutch as was his right in 
the 1884 Dutch Language Judicial Use Act.  
52  Op cit., ftn 53, p. 54; and 
     KASANGA, L., “Language Use and Challenges in a Multicultural, Multilingual Post-apartheid 
South Africa: A view from Applied Linguistics,” Université da la Réunion, Faculté des Lettres et 
des Sciences humaines, ORACLE: www2.univ-reunion.fr/~ageof/text/74c21e88-291.html. 
53  MADIBA, Mbulungeni, “Towards a Model for Terminology Modernisation in the African 
Languages of South Africa,” Language Matters, Vol. 32, 2001, p. 54. 
54  S v. Lesaena 1993 (2) SACR 264 (T) 
55  Lesaena, p. 265. 
56  Lesaena, p. 264. 
57  Lesaena, p. 264. 
58  Lesaena, p. 265. 
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the interpreter if the accused is able to express themselves in one of the two official 
languages of the court (that being English and Afrikaans at that time).59  The judge 
decided that such an irregularity as not allowing the accused to use the language of his 
choice vitiated the trial and the conviction was set aside.60  An interesting note to this 
judgment is the reasons why the judge thought that an accused would prefer to speak 
the language of the court, namely, that Afrikaans may “be a more suitable vehicle for 
the expression of nuances and distinctions appropriate to court proceedings…” because 
“(h)e might plausibly have reasoned that the vigour and force of the indigenous 
language might be debilitated in translation.”61  We will see how 12 years later, this 
concern may be a common-place characteristic of the courtroom.  
 
In S v. Ngubane,62 the Transvaal High Court had a chance to interpret s. 25(3)(i) of the 
Interim Constitution.  As stated above, this was the precursor to s. 35(3)(k) of the so-
called final Constitution and had a slightly different wording:  
s. 25(e) Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, which shall 
include the right: 
(i) to be tried in a language which he or she understands or, failing this, to have the 
proceedings interpreted to him or her;63
 
The accused was a Zulu-speaker and certain witness statements were given in 
Afrikaans.64  It became obvious to the magistrate that the interpreter was not strong in 
isiZulu and that the accused had not understood what was happening during the 
proceedings.65  The matter was sent for review to the High Court before a decision on 
conviction had been reached.  The High Court agreed to hear the review since it 
involved a fundamental right to a fair trial.66  The court thus found that the accused had 
had his Constitutional right to a fair trial infringed.67  It was suggested by the State 
Prosecutor that the trial may be salvaged if the evidence was played back by audio tape 
to the new interpreter for translation for the accused.68  The judge refused this remedy 
stating that the right to interpretation should “be construed as meaning that the 
                                                 
59  Lesaena, p. 265.  
60  Lesaena, p. 266.  
61  Lesaena, p. 265. 
62  S v. Ngubane 1995 (1) SACR 384 (T) 
63  S. 25(3)(i) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 as reported in Ngubane, 
p.385. 
64  Ngubane, p. 384.  
65  Ngubane, p. 384.  
66  Ngubane, p. 385.  
67  Ngubane, p. 385.  
68  Ngubane, p. 385.  
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interpretation should take place simultaneously with the testimony given by the 
witness” and that “the interpretation will be in a language which the accused fully 
understands and not into a language which he understands partially…”69  It was 
therefore decided that the proceedings a quo would be set aside and that the matter 
would be reheard by another magistrate, presumably this time with a competent 
interpreter. 
 
Another decision decided under the Interim Constitution was S v. Ndala.70  In this case, 
the magistrate was concerned not only with the competence of the interpreter, but also 
by the fact that he had not properly been sworn-in under Magistrates Courts Rule 68.  
The matter was sent for review by the High Court.   The court reiterated the obligations 
of magistrates under s. 6(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act declaring that it is the 
magistrate’s duty to determine whether the accused is “sufficiently conversant” in the 
language of evidence and, if not, to provide that person with the services of a 
“competent” interpreter.71  Failing to use a competent interpreter will lead to a gross 
irregularity and subsequent invalidation.  A competent interpreter must be able to give a 
“true and correct”72 interpretation of evidence as is implicitly guaranteed by s. 25(3)(i) 
of the Constitution.   
 
The court then examined the issue of swearing-in and the requirement of swearing-in 
interpreters under Rule 68.73  The court said that if the interpreter had not been duly 
sworn in, then he or she would be unable to administer the oath to witnesses as 
contemplated by s. 165 Criminal Procedure Act.  This would have the effect that the 
evidence given by the accused could not be used as evidence.74  There would be the 
additional problem of the interpretation being given truly and correctly by someone 
who is not “conscience bound”75 to interpret in this way.  Once again, the court refused 
to allow a competent interpreter to listen and certify that the evidence given had been 
                                                 
69  Ngubane, p. 385. 
70  S v. Ndala 1996 (2) SACR 218 (C)  
71  Ndala, p. 221.  
72  The terms “true and correct” are taken from the headnote of the JUTAstat decision.  The terms used 
in the original Afrikaans decision are “juis en getrou” on p. 221.   
73  Ndala, p. 221.  
74  Ndala, p. 223.  
75  This term is also taken from the headnote.  The original term used in the Afrikaans version is 
“gewetensverpligting” at p. 223.  
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correct.  The judge found that because that accused person’s fundamental right to a true 
and correct interpretation had been infringed, the proceedings would be set aside.76   
The issue of the obligations of magistrates under s. 6(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
was brought back to the fore in S v. Abrahams.77  In this 1997 decision, there was no 
mention of s. 35(3)(k) of the Final Constitution, but the prerequisite for a fair trial, 
namely that the accused could understand the proceedings at all times, was an 
important element in the decision.  The accused had been charged, among other things, 
of assault and was sentenced to six months in prison.78  At trial, the accused needed the 
assistance of an interpreter as he was hearing-impaired and communicated using sign 
language.79  The trial was conducted in Afrikaans, but the interpreter repeatedly told 
the court that his Afrikaans was weak.80  The interpreter also had to interrupt 
proceedings a number of times to indicate that he was unable to follow the proceedings 
and ask if everyone could speak more slowly.  A number of reports had been 
introduced in Afrikaans, including a report by a probation officer at sentencing.81  The 
court pointed out on review once again that the onus of finding a competent interpreter 
falls on the magistrate.82  Not calling a competent interpreter is an irregularity that 
vitiates the proceedings.83  The magistrate claimed in his report that it appeared to him 
that the accused understood some of the testimony.  The judge dismissed this since, 
first of all, the magistrate does not understand sign language and therefore would not 
know what is being interpreted to the accused84 and secondly, that the accused has the 
right to understand the proceedings at all times.85   
 
It is interesting to note that the above decision does not involve one of the official 
languages enumerated in s. 6(1) Constitution Act, 1996, but rather a “promoted” 
language under s. 6(5)(a).  It is clear by this decision as well as later decisions that this 
section is designed to protect an accused’s right to understand the proceedings against 
him or her regardless his or her language or method of communication. 
                                                 
76  Ndala, p. 224.  
77  S v. Abrahams see ftn 43 supra. 
78  Abrahams, p. 48.  
79  Abrahams, p. 48.  
80  Abrahams, p. 48.  
81  Abrahams, p. 49.  
82  Abrahams, p. 49.  
83  Abrahams, p. 49.  
84  Abrahams, p. 49. 
85  Abrahams, p. 49.  
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One of the more ground-breaking decisions in the interpretation of s. 35(3)(k) of the 
Constitution has been Mthethwa v. De Bruin NO and Another.86  It is in this decision 
that we start to see how the courts will interpret the practicality test in the language 
provisions of the Constitution.  The accused was a school teacher charged with stealing 
a motor vehicle.87  When arraigned, he requested that his trial be conducted in isiZulu, 
his mother tongue.88  The application was denied and he sought a review of the 
application by the High Court.89  The judge began by establishing that Mr. Mthethwa 
was in fact a school teacher and could speak English.90  He then continued by pointing 
out that although 98% of the cases in that magistrate’s court involved isiZulu speaking 
defendants, the practicalities of the situation suggest that it would be impossible to 
conduct trials in that language because:91
• 4 out of the 37 regional magistrates could speak isiZulu 
• 81 out of the Attorney-General’s 256 prosecutors could 
speak isiZulu and 6 our of the Attorney-General’s 41 
advocates could speak the language; and  
• only one out of the 22 judges in the Natal Division of the 
High Court could speak isiZulu. 
The make-up of the judiciary of the Natal Division was an important factor in this 
decision.  The fact that the vast majority of practitioners in the criminal justice system 
are unable to work with the language commonly spoken by accused persons led the 
court to decide that it would be impractical to expect that cases could be heard in the 
indigenous language of the area.92  This is especially true for the High Courts who have 
the responsibility of overseeing and reviewing many of the decisions in the lower 
magistrate courts, since these reviews must be heard “by no less than two judges,” and 
there was only one able to do so at that moment.93  The judge stated that the provision 
is clear:  
“Section 35(3)(k) does not give an accused person the right to have a trial 
conducted in the language of his choice.  Its provisions are perfectly plain, 
namely, that he has the right to be tried in a language that he understands or, if 
that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language.”94   
                                                 
86  Mthethwa v. De Bruin NO and Another, see ftn 28 supra. 
87  Mthethwa, p. 337.  
88  Mthethwa, p. 337.  
89  Mthethwa, p. 337.  
90  Mthethwa, p. 337.  
91  Mthethwa, p. 337-338. 
92  Mthethwa, p. 338.  
93  Mthethwa, p. 338.  
94  Mthethwa, p 338.  
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A careful reading of the judgment, however, does give rise to the hope that current 
impracticalities may not remain indefinitely.  At the beginning of the paragraph from 
which the above quotation was taken, the judge says: “Under these circumstances, as 
they obtain in this province at present, it is clearly not practicable for an accused person 
to demand to have the proceedings conducted in any language other than English or 
Afrikaans.”95 (my emphasis).  It appears that by qualifying this statement as the 
circumstances exist at present, that the situation may change to allow for trials in 
indigenous languages which would be understood by increasing numbers of indigenous 
language speakers gaining positions in the upper judiciary.  This phenomenon has 
already been recorded by people working as interpreters in courts who have noticed a 
growing tendency for interpreters used to translate for no one except the record in 
situations where the magistrate, prosecutor and defendant all speak the same 
language.96  The problems for the accused resulting from such a situation will be 
explored later.  Suffice it to say that as the monumental changes that are sweeping all 
spheres of South African society find their way through the judiciary, the linguistic 
“circumstances” that led to the finding of impracticability in Mthethwa will change.   
 
On the heels of the decision in Mthethwa came another decision from the High Court in 
Bisho that followed much the same lines.  In S v. Matomela,97 the court was faced with 
the issue of the magistrate, the prosecutor and the accused who all spoke the same 
indigenous language and, due to a shortage of interpreters at the time, the magistrate 
chose to conduct the trial in that language, in this case, isiXhosa.98   The facts of this 
case are somewhat important and explain in part why it was so urgent to use the 
indigenous language as the language of record.  The accused was charged with 
breaking a maintenance order and pleaded guilty to the charge.99  The sentence had 
conditions which included deducting the amounts owed from his salary.  On the day of 
the trial, there was a shortage of interpreters.  However, it was also recognized that 
further delaying the matter would not only be detrimental to the interests of the 
accused, but to the complainant as well who was dependant on the money owed.100  
                                                 
95  Mthethwa, p. 338.  
96  INGGS, Judith, “Current Developments in Court Interpreter Training in South Africa” Proteus, Vol. 
VII, No. 4, Fall, 1998.  Accessed through: www.najit.org/proteus/back_issues/inggs.htm  
97  S v. Matomela 1998 (3) BCLR 339 (Ck) 
98  Matomela, p. 340.  
99  Matomela, p. 340.  
100  Matomela, p. 341.  
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The presiding magistrate approached the regional magistrate about this problem and it 
was decided that since all parties were isiXhosa speaking, the Constitution would 
permit that the trial could continue in that language.101 When the case came before the 
High Court on automatic review, the judge requested an explanation and “full answers” 
as to why the record was completely in isiXhosa.102 In his report to the High Court 
judge for the review, the regional magistrate speaking on behalf of the presiding 
magistrate stated, “I did not want the presiding officer to act as an interpreter.”103   
 
The reasons that the Regional Magistrate gave were based in law and the Constitution.  
He reported that s. 6(1) Constitution Act, 1996 lists isiXhosa as one of South Africa’s 
official languages.104  Read with sections 6(2) and (4), he relied on the imperative that 
“practical measures to advance the use of the Xhosa language must be taken” and that 
“all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and be treated equitably.”105  He 
also relied on s. 35(3)(k) and felt it the “most persuasive” argument as it gives the right 
to be tried in a language which the accused understands and would therefore permit a 
trial in isiXhosa.106  He further stated that “(n)o prejudice would be caused to anyone in 
Court at that moment if Xhosa was used.”107  Tshabalala, J., the presiding Judge, found 
the reasons “fair and reasonable in the circumstances.”108  He also found, however, that 
the widespread use of indigenous languages, especially as more members of indigenous 
language groups are appointed to positions in the criminal justice system and to courts 
of the country, would create problems in the future.109  He stated that in the absence of 
legislation in terms of language in court as contemplated by s. 171 of the Constitution, 
which allows the legislature to establish procedures in courts, the Constitutional 
provisions are binding.110   
 
It is interesting to note here that the Interim Constitution clearly allowed an accused 
person and witnesses to use the “South African language of his or her choice” during 
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proceedings and require those proceedings to be interpreted into a language that the 
accused person understands.111  This section also made explicit mention that the record 
could be kept in any official language, provided that the status of existing languages of 
record are not be diminished (i.e. English and Afrikaans).112  This was a right to 
language rather than a right to effective communication, but it was not included in the 
1996 Constitution leaving the language of record issue subject to interpretation or 
legislative intervention.   
 
Matomela is thus well known for the suggestion, in obiter, that the Department of 
Justice, “for practical reasons and for better administration of justice,”113 adopt a sole 
language of record for the court system that could be used by all court officials 
whatever their own language may be.114  The Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has considered this option and, quoting the case, proposed English as the 
sole language of record in a 2000 speech by the minister, Dr. Penuell Maduna.115  As 
will be seen, later cases have thrown this proposal into an uncertain future.  
  
The duties and obligations of magistrates under s. 35(3)(k) were further clarified in the 
case of S v. Chauke and Another.116  Two men were accused of housebreaking and 
elected to represent themselves.117  The problem arose from the fact that the magistrate 
did not properly explain the dangers of being convicted for an alternative competent 
verdict, which vitiated their s. 35(3)(a) rights to be informed of the charge with 
sufficient detail.118   More importantly for our purposes, the reviewing judge found it 
difficult to ascertain whether the accused had been tried in a language that he 
understood or had the proceedings interpreted into the language.119  The judge stated 
that the question of whether an accused was tried in a language which he or she 
understands is a question of fact and must therefore be determine by recourse to the 
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record of the proceedings.120  Thus, the judged warned magistrates and interpreters that 
magistrates must make it clear in the record that the accused person’s s. 35(3)(k) rights 
had been respected and that the trial was conducted in a language that the accused 
understood.121  
  
The judgment gives an indication of how other courts may examine a record in order to 
ascertain whether s. 35(3)(k) rights had been respected.  This gives reviewing courts 
direction when studying a record to determine whether the language provisions of the 
accused’s right to a fair trial had been met.  This judgment is also important as it gives 
magistrates the responsibility of ensuring that the record reflects whether the accused 
was tried in such a language.  This is an important detail in any record, given the 
myriad of languages used in court and the daily difficulties in finding appropriate 
interpreters for a given session or accused.   
 
An example of such difficulties can be found in Tshabalala v. S.122  In this case, the 
court was notified by defence counsel that the accused was isiZulu-speaking, but the 
appropriate interpreter was busy in another courtroom.123  The accused agreed to use an 
interpreter who spoke isiXhosa due to the closeness of the two languages.124  The 
magistrate agreed and language was not an issue for the rest of the trial.125  On appeal, 
the High Court judge reviewed the record and found that there was no indication that 
she did not understand the questions or answered inappropriately.126  From this finding 
of fact (as in Chauke) the judge found that the application had no merit and dismissed 
that part of the appeal.127 The judge, however, did mention that perhaps it would have 
been more appropriate to have waited for an interpreter who spoke isiZulu, but 
mentioned as well that the accused’s acceptance and subsequent silence on the issue 
during trial “indicates that she waived her right to an interpreter of her choice” as 
suggested by the State representative.128  If the accused has a right to an interpreter of 
her choice, does this stem from the Constitutional right or the dictates of fundamental 
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justice?  Most likely, the Constitutional right does not give such a broad meaning since 
it states that the accused has the right to interpretation into “that language,” referring to 
the language understood in the first part of s. 35(3)(k).  It may stem from the continuing 
confusion between language and cultural rights as opposed to the right of 
communication in court.  If the right to interpretation in the language of choice does 
exist, however, it most likely stems from the dictates of fundamental justice.   
 
This language of choice debate is followed in S v. Grace129 where the court found that 
an Afrikaans-speaking accused had been tried completely in English.  It is unclear 
whether the accused understood the language in court, but the judge found it fit to 
declare that the magistrate had an obligation to respect the accused’s right to use the 
language of her own choice.130  It is once again unclear where the right to a trial in the 
accused’s language is based. 
 
As mentioned above, the Department of Justice heeded the obiter dictum in Matomela 
and proposed in 2000 that English be adopted as the sole language of record for all 
courts in South Africa.  The debate which was generated from this proposal led some to 
question whether the use of Afrikaans, which many Black practitioners do not speak, is 
blocking the appointment of Black justices to South African benches.131  Others have 
argued against the proposed government policy believing that elevating the status of 
any of the official languages to the detriment of the others is unconstitutional.132    
 
In the midst of this debate, the High Court in the Northern Cape decided that the 
Constitution guaranteed not only a right to a trial in a language one understands, but in 
one’s own language as well as the right to communicate with counsel in that language, 
either directly or by means of an interpreter. S v. Pienaar133 represents a dramatic shift 
from the gathering jurisprudence surrounding s. 35(3)(k).   The accused in this case 
faced drug charges and was sentenced accordingly.  During the trial, the accused had 
been accepted for legal aid and was assigned counsel who only spoke English, which 
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the accused did not speak and therefore asked that she withdraw.134  It was at this point, 
the judge decided, that the magistrate should have explained the accused’s right to a 
legal representative with whom he could communicate in his own language or through 
an interpreter.135  As this right to counsel was never properly explained to the accused, 
his right to a fair trial had been violated and therefore the sentence and conviction were 
set aside.136    
 
The judge also examined the question of whether the accused had the right to a trial in 
Afrikaans in the Northern Cape, despite the Department of Justice’s intention to make 
English the sole language of record in South African courts.  As in Mthethwa, the judge 
resorted to the statistics to prove his point.  In this case, however, the judge felt that 
since 72% of cases are heard in Afrikaans compared to 1.4% in English and the fact 
that a large percentage of the population of the Northern Cape does not understand any 
English,137 it would be impossible to say that a trial in Afrikaans is impracticable.  He 
further stated that where a court does find it impracticable, it is due to a failure on the 
part of the Department of Justice to respect the provisions of the Constitution relating to 
language.138  The judge relied on a number of provisions read with each other to come 
to this conclusion: 
• s. 6(1) Magistrates’ Courts Act: this provides that either of the official 
languages may be used at any time of a trial;139 
• s. 6(1) Constitution Act, 1996: this section lists Afrikaans as one of the 
official languages of South Africa and therefore may be used in 
courts;140 
• s. 6(2) Constitution Act, 1996: the judge found this subsection more to 
the point as elevating English above the other official languages would 
come into conflict with the provisions of taking “practical and positive 
measures to elevate the status and use of indigenous languages;”141  
• s. 6(3) Constitution Act, 1996: the issue of “practicality” was examined 
using this article.  As stated in an above section the government may 
take into account several factors when choosing the use of official 
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languages such as usage, practicality, expense regional circumstances 
as well as the needs and preferences of the population as a whole or in 
the province concerned.  The court examined the situation in the 
Northern Cape and found that using English in the courts of a province 
where the majority are Afrikaans-speaking would be in conflict with 
each of those factors.142 
• s. 6(4) Constitution Act, 1996: finally, the elevating of English as the 
only official language of record would be in direct conflict with the 
provisions of this article that stipulate that “all official languages must 
enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equitably.”143 
 
The judge went on to say that an interpretation of s. 35(3)(k) was not necessary as s. 
6(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act and s. 6(1) of the Constitution give the accused the 
right to a trial in Afrikaans.  No interpretation of s. 35(3)(k) could restrict this right.144  
It was thus the obligation of the government to ensure that the languages spoken in the 
Northern Cape enjoy the parity of esteem and equitable treatment that the Constitution 
guarantees them.145  He then reviewed the judgment in Matomela agreeing with the 
Senior Magistrate’s opinion of the constitutionality of the use of a language other than 
English or Afrikaans in court, but disapproved with Tshabalala J.’s recommendation of 
one language becoming the designated language of record.146  A quote from the 
Canadian case of R v. Beaulac,147 which will be examined more in depth in the section 
on international jurisprudence, sums up his point that language rights “can only be 
enjoyed if the means are provided.”148   Thus, Buys J. came to four decisions:149
 
1. that the accused had the right to a fair trial; 
2. that this right included the right to be tried in Afrikaans; 
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3. that this right included the right to the assistance of a legal representative 
with whom he could communicate directly, or in exceptional cases where 
this was not practicable, through an interpreter; and 
4. that the magistrate had the obligation to explain these rights to the 
accused.150 
The judgment in Pienaar has added fuel to the fire of the debate surrounding the use of 
language in court.  Not allowing an argument based on practicalities to be used to 
restrict the use in court of the language of the majority of the province has added a 
dimension to the use of practicality as a test which would allow the widespread use of 
interpreters in court.  Declaring English as the sole language of record in the Northern 
Cape would be unconstitutional, according to Buys, J., not only because of the 
obligations put on the state to promote the official languages of South Africa, but also 
because of the impracticalities that would be caused by the widespread use of 
interpreters in courts where a dominant language is clear. 
 
In reading this decision, however, one must ask certain practical questions about how it 
may be interpreted in other parts of the country.  One such question would be whether it 
can be used in the case of an indigenous language.  Afrikaans, as stated earlier has been 
developed into a modern legal language while South Africa’s indigenous languages 
were intentionally under-developed. Would this state of indigenous languages allow for 
a successful impracticality argument?  This may be particularly true given the fact that 
Afrikaans is, today, readily understood by High Court judges and higher in the judiciary 
for reviews and appeals.  The judge points out that Afrikaans was once regarded in this 
way as well and that the legislature chose to include the use of all eleven official 
languages so that on day that too could be used as languages in court.151   
 
The counter argument has thus been made with regards to introducing English as the 
sole language of record in South African courts.  This decision has been used to protect 
language use in court and especially, not to diminish the status and use of Afrikaans in 
court.152  Perhaps the bellum juridicam has turned a new leaf.   
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One example of the impracticalities of widespread use of interpreters was seen in S v. 
Lekheto.153  In this case, the accused did not have legal representation.  At the 
sentencing stage, the accused was invited to address the court when the magistrate 
asked: “What do you say?”154  The magistrate did not explain what was meant by this 
and had given the responsibility of explaining the rights of the accused of addressing 
the court at this stage to the interpreter.155  The judge found that a magistrate has a duty 
to explain rights to accused.  “Such duty cannot be delegated to the interpreter.”156  An 
interpreter should not “originate” explanations, but only interpret the explanation given 
to the accused.157  
 
Another case of an unrepresented accused not having his rights properly explained to 
him was S v. Van Staden.158  After a trial in a magistrate’s court, the case was referred 
to a regional magistrate’s court for sentencing as contemplated in the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.159  At that stage, the senior magistrate asked why an 
interpreter had not been used and sent the case to the High Court for review.160  At that 
level, the judge reviewed the record and found that although the accused seemed “fairly 
at home” in English, he should have had his language rights explained to him by the 
magistrate.161  The conviction was therefore set aside for want of a fair trial.162  
 
The right of communication in s. 35(3)(k) is as we have seen, one of the prerequisites 
for a fair trial.163  The right to participate and understand the proceedings is a right in 
fundamental justice.  A violation of either of those principles may lead to a vitiating of 
the trial proceedings, without having to prove the prejudice.164   This remedy, however, 
is not the only one with which judges equip themselves.   
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Contrary to the decision in Ngubane, the court in S v. Siyotula165 felt that no prejudice 
would come to the accused if an improper interpretation was reinterpreted by another 
interpreter for the record.  The accused was a public prosecutor charged under the 
Corruption Act 94 of 1992.  He made use of an interpreter throughout his trial.166  The 
case was only partially heard when it was sent to the High Court for review after it was 
found that the testimony of two of the state’s witnesses as well as the accused’s own 
testimony bad been interpreted by an unsworn interpreter.167   
 
The judge found that employing the same remedy suggested in Ngubane and Ndala 
would not be appropriate.168  He relied rather on the solution in S v. Naidoo169 which 
allowed the testimony from the two state witnesses to be reinterpreted in open court.  
This was considered a more “practical and sensible” method of dealing with the 
irregularity of the unsworn interpreter.170  It was decided that as long as no prejudice 
would come to their case, such an alternative would be suitable.  Prejudice was defined 
as “prejudice in the conduct of a party’s case.”171  One of the reasons why the 
accused’s case had not been prejudiced, in the opinion of the court, was because he was 
a public prosecutor in the Port Elizabeth magistrate’s court and therefore “conducts 
cases every day of his life in a language which is not his mother tongue.”172  One of the 
state witnesses testified in English which was the language that he chose to use when 
conducting cases.  The other state witness testified in Afrikaans.  According to the 
judge, it was common practice in the Eastern Cape for English-speaking court officers 
to ask questions to Afrikaans-speaking witness in English and allow the witness to 
respond in Afrikaans if they so chose.173  It was only when the witness did not 
understand the question that an interpreter would be used.  It was because of this 
situation in the courts in which the accused worked as a prosecutor that despite the fact 
that he said he was not fluent in Afrikaans, “this cannot mean that he does not 
understand evidence given in his court in Afrikaans.”174  Because he supposedly 
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understood the testimony of the two witnesses, the judge was satisfied that his right to 
understand the language of the testimony was not infringed and therefore his case 
would not be prejudiced if the testimony was given again with proper interpretation.175   
 
With regards to his own testimony, it was decided that it should be stricken from the 
record since it was not properly interpreted as well as not made under a duly sworn oath 
and the defense’s case should start afresh with the choice of re-testifying or not.176  
This was not seen to prejudice the accused’s case because a) he would have no 
legitimate reason to change his testimony and b) the magistrate being an experienced 
judicial officer, he would be able to “disabuse his mind” of any impressions already 
formed during his initial testimony.177  It was in this way that the judge felt would be 
the appropriate way to remedy the situation as the prejudice caused in this case would 
not lead to unfairness or a miscarriage of justice. 
 
The court distinguished this case from Ngubane and Ndala based on the fact that in 
those two cases, the accused were unrepresented as well as the fact that in Ngubane, the 
accused had not fully understood the language that the interpreter had used.178   It 
would appear, however, that not all courts would make such efforts to distinguish from 
past cases.  The right to proper interpretation was upheld in S v. Ndlovu179 where the 
proceedings were set aside due to the fact that a major portion of the evidence had not 
been interpreted into a language with which the accused was comfortable.180  The judge 
relied both on Pienaar to void the proceedings due to a “gross infringement” of his s. 
35(3)(k) right to a fair trial as well as on Abrahams to indicate that the magistrate had a 
duty to explain these rights to the accused.181  It should be noted that the judge make 
these findings despite the fact that the accused was represented by legal counsel. 
 
The magistrate’s duty to provide a competent interpreter as contemplated by s. 6(2) of 
the Magistrates’ Courts Act was further explained in S v. Swarbooi182 where the fact 
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that the interpreter was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that the 
interpretation was probably not correct from a reading of the record required a 
remedy.183  Relying on Siyotula, the judge found that no prejudice would be caused if 
the evidence of the accused for that day was given afresh with another interpreter.184  It 
should be noted that it was only the accused’s testimony from that session that was 
affected by the irregularity.  The trial was ordered to continue and the accused’s 
testimony from that session be stricken from the record.185   
 
Pienaar was once again relied upon in S v. Mlambo186 to enforce an accused’s right to 
a legal representative with whom he could communicate in his own language.  The 
accused elected to represent himself after apparently problems in communicating with 
his lawyer.  The court assumed from the questions and answers in the record that this 
was most likely due to a language barrier since he had requested an isiZulu-speaking 
attorney several times during the proceedings.  Choosing to represent oneself must be 
“an informed and voluntary election.”187  To meet the right requirement to the right to 
legal interpretation, legal representation must be “effective.”188  Since counsel could 
not communicate with his lawyer in his own language, the judge decided that he had 
not had effective representation.  This was one of the fair trial violations that lead to 
vitiating the proceedings.   
 
Another challenge facing the courts is the rise in the number of people in South Africa 
who do not speak any of the country’s official languages.  This was the case in Mponda 
v S189 where the accused, originally from Malawi, spoke only basic English and had 
some knowledge of other languages, as evidenced by the record, but not enough to be 
able to understand the interpretation provided.190  Eventually, the court approached the 
Malawian Embassy for a translator who spoke the language of the accused.191  An 
interpreter was found, but the record is unclear whether he spoke the same language 
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since the magistrate had to ask several times if they were following the proceedings.192  
The record also neglected to mention whether the casual interpreter had been properly 
sworn-in.  The attorney representing the accused also reported communication 
difficulties with his client.  Because of these language difficulties, the court decided 
that the accused had not had his fair trial rights respected which was, once again, one of 
the factors leading to the conviction being set aside.193  The court suggested that the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development establish a board of interpreters 
competent in other African languages spoken by large communities in South Africa.   
This judgment illustrates the continuing difficulties with interpreters in court and 
recognizes that the right to a trial in a language that the accused understands includes 
languages not mentioned in the Constitution. 
 
Finally, the issue of a sole language of record for South African courts was recently 
revisited.  Once again, in S v. Damoyi194 the court found itself with a lack of 
interpreters for a case that had already been postponed several times.  As all of the 
judicial officers present were proficient in isiXhosa, it was decided to proceed in that 
language rather than postpone the matter again in order to wait for an interpreter.195 
The case was brought to the High Court for review.  At that stage, the judge agreed 
with the finding in Matomela that the use of an indigenous language was constitutional 
and that the proceedings had been in accordance with the principles of justice.196  The 
judge was not satisfied, however, with the delays that were caused to the review court 
because of the difficulties in transcribing the portion of the record in isiXhosa into 
English.197  The judge reviewed the issue of the parity of official languages as 
guaranteed by s. 6(4) of the Constitution Act, 1996 and found that matters of 
practicality would forced him to agree with the recommendation in Matomela of the 
adoption of a sole language of record for courts.  “Sanity would tip the scale in favour 
of English” since it is the language most often used in international commerce and 
transactions.198  The judge reviewed the case-law behind the development of the issue 
for English as the sole language of record and disagreed with the finding in Pienaar, 
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stating that s. 6 of the Constitution supercedes s. 6 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act and 
therefore the right to be tried in Afrikaans is not in conformity with s. 6 of the 
Constitution.199  It is unfortunate that the judge did not develop this reasoning further. 
 
A review of the case-law surrounding language issues in the courtroom highlights a 
number of themes that have been important in the debate, particularly in the last eleven 
years of constitutional development: 
1. Interpretation: interpreters have long been commonplace in 
South African courtrooms.  The new constitutional requirements, however, have made 
issues of interpretation critical to a fair trial.  These issues included proper training, an 
adequately staffed corps of interpreters, balancing of the rights to a timely trial when no 
interpreter is available, proper swearing-in of interpreters who can then swear-in other 
witnesses, namely the accused and the role that interpreters play in a courtroom. 
2. Constitutional Development: courts have been asked to define 
the constitutional provisions relating to fair trials as well as the protection and 
promotion of language use in courts.  Is the right guaranteed in s. 35(3)(k) a language 
right or simply a communication right in order to understand the proceedings?  Does 
the imperative of advancement of indigenous languages in s. 6 change the nature of this 
right?  Courts have as well had to grapple with the idea of “practicability” and when it 
is appropriate to invoke practicality issues in order to serve the administration of 
justice.  Older statutes still in force after the adoption of the Constitution have also 
required legal interpretation to relate them to the new legal order, namely for our 
purposes, the Magistrates’ Courts Act. 
3. Language of Record: the courts of the country appear to be 
divided with regards to the suggestion made by certain judges that English should be 
adopted as the sole language of record for South African courts.  This suggestion has 
been supported by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, although 
no clear policy has yet been introduced.200  Some courts, however, have been less 
enthusiastic about the adoption of a sole language of record for the country’s courts and 
have gone so far as to declare that such a move would be unconstitutional. 
4. Remedies: what is the appropriate remedy a violation regarding 
the language rights of the accused?  As an essential element of the right to a fair trial, 
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both in fundamental justice as well as the enumerated fair trial provisions in s. 35 (3) of 
the Constitution, this remedy may lead to vitiating the proceedings or, post-conviction, 
to setting aside the conviction and sentence.  However, courts have also looked for 
more “practical and sensible”201 alternative remedies.   
These themes are not unique to South Africa, but in many court systems which serve a 
multilingual population.  In the next chapter, we shall examine the provisions and case-
law in international and foreign jurisdictions with an eye on how those jurisdictions 
have dealt with these issues. 
 
3. International and Foreign Perspectives 
a) Language Rights in International Law 
There is no one instrument in international law which focuses on language rights.  The 
language rights recognized internationally have been included in a variety of 
conventions and documents. One of the most widely accepted is art. 14(3)(f) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which makes provision 
for “the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language 
used in court.”202   
 
As seen by the wording of the above provision, it offers similar rights of 
communication rather than language rights as does s. 35(3)(k) Constitution Act, 1996, 
when it stands alone.  This is evidenced by the decision of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC) in the case of Dominique Guesdon v. France.203   
Guesdon had been accused of vandalizing French street signs and was brought before 
the French Tribunal correctionnel.  There he demanded to address the court in his 
native language of Bréton with the assistance of an interpreter.  He also planned to 
present 12 witnesses who would also testify in Bréton.  The tribunal refused the 
application which required that the accused and his witnesses address the court in 
French, and the case was brought before the UNHRC who upheld the tribunal’s 
decision.  They indicated that since Guesdon and his twelve witnesses were proficient 
in the French language, his right to a fair trial had not been violated.  Art. 14(1) of the 
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ICCPR was designed to ensure procedural equity in criminal proceedings and not 
necessarily to limit the rights of the state to use one official language for court.204   
 
A similar finding was made by the UNHRC in Yves Cadoret and Hervé Le Behan v. 
France205 where the UNHRC found that once again, because the parties were 
sufficiently conversant in the language of the court, they were not entitled to a state-
funded interpreter.  It is only when there is difficulty in understanding or expressing 
oneself that the court must provide the services of an interpreter.206   
 
Another area of the Covenant which has been invoked to protect language rights is Art. 
19 which, among other things, provides for freedom of expression.207  The UNHRC in 
Yves Cadoret dealt with this argument rather negatively finding that not being able to 
speak the language of their choice in French courts did not raise issues under Art 19(2) 
and therefore was not admissible.208   
 
Similar provisions for language rights in court are found in regional conventions.  The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
contains at art. 6(3)(e) an identical provision to the ICCPR.  In the case of Isop v. 
Austria209 from the European Commission on Human Rights, the Commission found 
similarly to the UNHRC that the accused did not have the right to use Slovene in 
Austrian courts which use exclusively German.  The Commission also found that the 
accused’s understanding of the German language did not require the use of an 
interpreter.  The European Court on Human Rights found for another three applicants’ 
rights to an interpreter under art. 6 of the ECHR in German courts seeing as they could 
not speak the German language.210  But the European Court qualified this right in 
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Kamasinski v. Austria211 when stating that this right does not extend to a written 
translation of all written material or documents. “The interpretation assistance provided 
should be such as to enable the defendant to have knowledge of the case against him 
and to defend himself, notably by being able to put before court his version of 
events.”212  Notification of the charge, however, is given special attention as art. 6(3) of 
the European Convention requires that the accused be notified of the charge in a 
language that he or she understands. 
   
The question of languages is particularly important for the international and 
internationalized courts that have proliferated since the beginning of the 1990’s.  
Following the stipulations in the ICCPR, interpretation is a right in all international 
courts.213  However, these provisions have caused delays and problems in its 
administration, much like the predictions of South African judges who argue for one 
language of record in court to reduce these delays.  Both the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) have experienced 
long delays waiting for the translations of the numerous documents used as evidence in 
proceedings.214  In addition to these practical problems have been the cross-cultural 
misunderstandings when translating concepts such as “rape” or “murder” that may have 
different meanings not only across lines of language, but over cultural lines as well.215
The quality of interpretation varies as well depending on the resources available to the 
court in question.  Courts which are relatively well resourced, such as the ICTY, have 
better quality interpretation than courts with less resources such as the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone or the courts being established in Cambodia.  The worry is that these 
delays and problems may cause the proceedings to be found to violate the fair trial 
requirements of fundamental justice.216
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b)    Language Rights in Foreign Jurisdictions 
The rights to language use in criminal courts vary from one jurisdiction to another 
depending on a number of factors.  Much like the case in South Africa, a country’s 
history, population, and political climate influence the law on language protection and 
the languages used in courts.  The following section will look at some Canadian cases 
for constitutional comparison, as it the only foreign case-law examined in the South 
African cases reviewed above, as well as a brief look at how other multilingual 
societies deal with the issue of language in court.   
 
i)   Canada and Language Rights in Criminal Court 
The Canadian law on language rights reflects the country’s historical deep-rooted 
divisions based on language.  Language has played, and continues to play, a pivotal role 
in the Canadian legal and political scene.  This is evidenced by the fact that one-third of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is devoted to language rights.217  This 
“political compromise,” however, has led courts to interpret language rights differently 
than the other rights in the Charter.   Before delving into the issue of language rights in 
the criminal justice system, it may be necessary to explain the way in which the justice 
system in Canada is governed.  In terms of s. 91 of the Constitution Act of 1867,218 the 
federal government has the power to legislate the criminal law while s. 92 of the same 
act gives the power of administrating these courts to the provincial legislatures.  This 
has resulted in a common criminal law for the country, the Criminal Code of Canada,219 
with somewhat varied administration of courts for each of the ten provinces.  It should 
be noted that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, entrenched in the 
Constitution, applies equally to federal as well as provincial governments as per s. 32 
(1)(b).   
 
The Constitution Act of 1867 protected language rights through s. 133 which allowed, 
among other language guarantees with respect to the use of English or French with the 
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government, that “either of those languages may be used by any person in any Pleading 
or Process issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, or in or from 
all or any of the Courts of Quebec.”220  For the most part, courts have applied this 
section restrictively.  After the advent of the Charter, this restrictive interpretation was 
continued by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1986 trilogy221 on language rights 
and the Constitution.  In MacDonald, the English-speaking complainant was given a 
summons in French only while in Bilodeau, the French-speaking complainant was 
given a summons in English only.  In Société des Acadiens, the francophone rights 
group made an application to be heard by a French-speaking judge.  In each of these 
decisions, the Supreme Court took a restrictive approach to both s. 133 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 as well as s. 19 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  It was 
ruled that as a “political compromise,” these language provisions should be interpreted 
more narrowly than the other rights and freedoms included in the Charter as an exercise 
of judicial restraint.222  The broad terms of these rights being available for “any Person” 
in s. 133 and s. 19 meant that they were equally open to officers of the court as well as 
the accused or complainants.  The judges noted, however, that the principles of a fair 
trial still apply and anyone who does not understand the language spoken in court must 
be provided with an interpreter.   
 
This narrow and restrictive interpretation of constitutional language rights has been re-
examined in the recent case of R v. Beaulac.223  This involved a criminal trial and 
therefore s. 530 and 530(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada were applicable.  These 
sections deal with the language rights of accused in criminal courts and allow an 
accused to make an application for his/her trial to be conducted before a judge or a 
judge and jury, as the case may be, who speak the official language (French and 
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English)224 of the accused.  This section is an imperative for applications made by the 
accused, but s. 530(4) allows the justice of the peace or judge to consider if the “best 
interests of justice” would be served if the trial were to continue in the official language 
of the accused.  If the language of the accused is not an official language of Canada, 
this section allows the judge or justice of the peace to decide in which official language 
the accused is most proficient.   
 
The decision in Beaulac is consistent with other Supreme Court of Canada recent 
decisions regarding language rights.  The principle of “minority protection” has been 
elevated to a constitutional principle thereby shedding light on the Court’s new 
direction for protecting language rights across Canada.225 This case was quoted in 
Pienaar examined above among other Canadian cases not necessarily dealing with 
language in criminal courts, but of the role that language plays in an individual’s 
identity.  The judge in Pienaar took note of the fact that official language use in court 
was an “absolute right” after studying the statutory rights and subjective ties of 
language with self.   
 
The Canadian cases, however, can be distinguished from the South African situation on 
a number of fronts.  Firstly, there is no provision in the Constitution such as s. 35(3)(k) 
of the South African Constitution that alludes to the right to a trial in a language that the 
accused understands.  The Canadian law is now clear in that an accused has the right to 
a trial in French or English upon application.  The limiting of the language of the 
courtroom to two official languages does not take into account the aboriginal languages 
of Canada,226 but also reduces the debate about language use in the court system.  Both 
jurisdictions do, however, have provisions for the use of interpreters if the accused does 
no understand the language of proceedings.227    
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Secondly, there is the question of practicality.  This issue will be explained further, but 
it is important to note that English and French are both developed legal languages in 
their own right. The indigenous languages of South Africa, as has already been noted, 
were intentionally under-developed.  However, some countries in Africa have made 
strides of modernizing their languages in order for them to be used in spheres of 
government including courts.  One such jurisdiction is Malawi, which shall be studied 
more closely in the next section. 
 
ii) Other Foreign Jurisdictions 
Countries which have struggled to free themselves from colonial bonds have often 
turned to their own languages in order to give their governing structures a more 
indigenous visage.228  Unfortunately, as the judges noted in the Mponda decision, the 
colonial scramble for places like Africa caused arbitrary lines caused lines to be drawn, 
thereby including many different languages and cultures into one state entity.229  
  
In Malawi, for example, there are 15 African languages spoken.230  English, however, 
has been retained as the country’s official language whereas Chichewa is the “national 
language” used for communication to the masses.231  English is also the language used 
for court proceedings.  This has created not only a system where most people feel 
frustrated and culturally ostracized, but also a system that is dependant on interpreters 
as only 0.0052% of the country’s population uses English at home.232  This type of 
system can lead to conflicts between lawyers and interpreters who both understand the 
languages spoken and disagree with the way the other is interpreting.  Often the 
interpretation is redundant as all of the legal officers and parties speak the same 
language.  These problems can be potentially be transcribed to South Africa and will be 
explored in the section on Interpretation.   
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 Other countries as well have adopted a single language for the judiciary.  India, for 
example, has retained English as its language of record for the higher courts, but in the 
lower courts, indigenous languages may be use beside English.233  Sometimes, 
judgments are written in the indigenous language, but must be translated to English if 
they are sent to higher courts for review or appeal.234
 
In China, the numerous dialects of Chinese are all considered official, but Mandarin 
Chinese is taught to all school children and is used by courts throughout the country.235   
As we have seen, a number of countries have differing policies on the use of language 
in their courts.  Jurisdictions such as Canada have limited themselves to two official 
languages for courts with the right to interpretation for anyone who does not speak 
those languages.  The constitutional principles have linked language with an 
individual’s identity and baggage of rights.  Other jurisdictions that are emerging from 
colonial administrations which imported their own languages and legal systems have 
opted to retain those languages for reasons of unity and practicality. 
 
South Africa, however, has provided in its Constitution a system which respects the 
individual’s attachment to language as in Canada, but with eleven official languages, 
nine of which have historically not been used as legal languages.  In the next sections, 
we shall explore more in depth the issues facing the South African criminal court 
system and examine possible recommendations.  
 
4. Interpretation in South African Courtrooms 
Interpreters have played an important role in South African courtrooms for a long times 
as is evidenced by the 1944 Magistrates’ Courts Act requiring magistrates to find 
competent interpreters for accused persons who do not understand the language of the 
court.  This role, however, has been the subject of study and some criticism by 
researchers and court officers.  The interpreter often finds their position as a 
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communicator between the two contesting parties who, by duty, has to serve the two 
impartially, 236 compromised as such by their position in the court hierarchy as their 
position as the cultural link between speakers of African indigenous languages speakers 
and a system that often feels overwhelming and beyond touch.   This section will 
examine the role that court interpreters play in the courtroom, especially in the context 
of a criminal justice system where the majority of accused is male, African, poorly 
educated and unrepresented in court.237   
 
Interpreters are employed by the Department of Justice on a full-time or part-time basis 
and on average speak seven languages, including the two de facto languages of record, 
English and Afrikaans.238  There is normally one interpreter assigned to a court who 
will interpret for the prosecution, defense, magistrate and, of course, the record.  
Despite their constant place in the courtroom, they are generally considered low in the 
courtroom’s hierarchy, perhaps due to their historically imposed view as an 
“unfortunate and undesirable necessity.”239
 
Prerequisites for a position as a court interpreter are a high school senior certificate and 
knowledge of another language.  The pay is not generally regarded as good and hopes 
for advancement can be limited.240  Many study at the same time in order to become 
state prosecutors or attorneys in “the more elegant law profession.”241  Interpreters 
often find themselves in a difficult position as not only an interpreter of words, but also 
of cultural differences.  Some interpreters actively play an advocacy role in court242 
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while others assimilate themselves into the workings of the courtroom and take on 
duties which ought to be filled by other court officers. 
As advocates, an interpreter can add information that may not have been provided by 
the magistrate or prosecutor.  For example, many accused are skeptical about the 
provision of legal aid as the idea that the State who is prosecuting them on one hand is 
also willing to pay for their own lawyer on the other.  The interpreter might therefore be 
inclined to add additional information to the accused, being aware already of this 
confusion.243  They may also be delegated the duty of explaining the details of court 
proceedings, such as explaining court procedure or explaining rights to accused.  This 
practice was criticized in Lekheto where the interpreter was given the responsibility of 
explaining to the accused their rights to address the court at sentencing.  This 
irregularity contributed to the setting aside of the conviction of the accused.   
 
The interpreter is sometimes called upon to bridge cultural gaps between the different 
officers in courts.244  Legal concepts often do not translate or are uninterpretable 
because of the significance that a legal concept may have in one language that does not 
exist in another.  A typical example is the terms “guilty” and “not guilty”.  These terms 
have been developing in English for nearly 1000 years, however in other languages, 
such as isiZulu, this term has not been fully developed.245  The answer therefore to the 
question may not be what is expected by the court and therefore the interpreter will 
attempt to fit the accused person’s answer into either guilty or not guilty.  Even in 
situations where the accused has representation with whom he or she can communicate 
in his or her own language, the practitioner may have difficulty expressing a legal 
concept that does not have an equivalent in an indigenous language.  Thus, even outside 
of a courtroom, the development of these concepts would play a role in improving 
access to justice.246   
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There are also instances where the interpreter’s role in the courtroom leads to him or 
her taking on duties that should be filled by other actors in the courtroom.  This can 
lead to negative effects for an accused who sees the interpreter as another player in his 
prosecution.  An interpreter may also assimilate the “values and attitudes of their court 
superiors” in the hierarchy.247  In this way, a courtroom that is negative towards 
defendants and does not take care of unrepresented defendants in particular, may be 
reflected by the negative, or sometimes derogatory,248 attitude of the interpreter.   The 
difficulties with relying on interpreters were highlighted by the judge in Pienaar who 
found that interpretation in the courtroom increases delays, increases phenomenally 
costs, and can lead to a decrease in the quality of testimony of witnesses.249
 
Formal training for interpreters is a recent phenomenon.  Whereas training in the past 
has consisted mostly of an overview of court procedures, now a diploma at universities 
across South Africa are giving many already practicing interpreters a structured 
curriculum including both the fundamentals of court interpretation as well as an 
introduction to law and court procedure.250    
 
A criticism of the role of interpretation in a courtroom should not be seen as a negative 
reflection on interpreters themselves.  Interpreters work under very difficult conditions, 
as does much of the criminal justice system, balancing between the fundamentals of 
their position and the realities of the courtroom.  Courtroom interpretation will always 
remain an essential part of the South African justice system. But it must be noted that 
the difficulties arising in the case-law examined above often stem from systemic 
problems outside the control of the interpreters themselves.  The two cases involving 
the use of indigenous languages as the language of record both involved a lack of 
interpreters and the courts’ unwillingness to postpone an accused’s matter any later due 
to delays that had already been incurred.251  An increasing problem, as well was seen in 
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Mponda where the number of cases requiring interpretation of languages not commonly 
spoken in South Africa.  In addition to the problem of finding interpreters who speak 
these languages, the procedural difficulties in the courtroom itself may exacerbate the 
situation requiring a translation from the foreign language into the language of record 
then into an indigenous language, for those who cannot speak the language of record, 
and then back again.  Those are problems that other jurisdictions have already 
experienced and cause long delays during the hearings themselves.252
 
Another phenomenon that is becoming more and more common and would surely 
increase if English was adopted as the sole language of record in courts, is the situation 
where the officers of the court and the defendant all speak the same language and the 
interpreter is not interpreting for the benefit of anyone in the courtroom, but merely for 
the record.253  This has led to a “cumbersome and time-consuming” process.  It can also 
lead to a situation where the parties in court disagree over the interpretation of what is 
being said rather than the substance of the statement.254
 
Interpretation is an essential part of any courtroom in a multilingual society.  But as 
stated by the court in Pienaar, interpreted testimony is “second best”255 to the witness 
and especially the accused, being able to give testimony and follow proceedings in their 
own language.  The duties given to magistrates in s. 6(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
must also oblige them to monitor the activities of interpreters in their courtrooms to 
ensure that the accused, who is more often than not unrepresented, is receiving a proper 
interpretation of the proceedings, as close as possible to a situation where they are in a 
language that he or she understands.256
 
 
 
                                                 
252  Op cit. ftn 230, p. 12. 
253 Op cit., ftn 239, p. 2.
254 Op cit. ftn 230, p. 11. 
255 Pienaar, para 20. 
256 Op cit., ftn 244, p. 221. 
 46
5.  Practicability in the Language Provisions of the Constitution 
As stated in s. 35(3)(k) of the Constitution, interpretation should be used when it is not 
practicable to conduct the trial in a language which the accused understands.  It has 
been noted that this is the alternative only when the test for practicability has been 
met.257  As seen from the examples of case-law selected above, it appears that this test 
is met when the accused does not understand one of the languages of record still used in 
courts today.  In fact, it is only when the provision is reversed, and an interpreter is not 
available, that the proceedings may then be conducted in the languages that the accused 
understands.258  Both of those cases, however, strongly recommended the adoption of 
one language of record to reduce the problems posed to the administration of justice.  
The one case that did speak against the adoption of English as the sole language of 
record has been in favour of the accused’s right to use Afrikaans as his mother tongue 
during his trial.  As will be seen below, this would not pose the same practical problems 
which the courts in Matomela and Damoyi decried.  
 
What are these practicality problems to which the above cases were referring?  One 
such practicality is the delays and the costs involved in translating a record into English 
or Afrikaans which for the majority of the judiciary, are the only official languages that 
they speak.259 One of the leading cases in exploring this line of thought was 
Mthethwa.260  In this case, the judge gave a clear picture of the linguistic make-up of 
the judiciary in the Natal Division of the High Court.  In 1998, when the judgment was 
rendered, there was only one judge of the twenty-two in the division who was able to 
speak isiZulu, the language in which the complainant wanted to have his trial 
conducted.  The judge noted that in order for appeals and reviews to be heard, there 
must be at least two judges available to hear the matter.  The linguistic make-up of the 
officers of the magistrate courts revealed a similar situation, as only 81 out of the 256 
prosecutors in the regional courts had isiZulu as their first language.261  Judge Hlophe, 
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Judge President of the Cape High Court gave a similar view of the linguistic situation 
of legal officers in the Western Cape in a radio interview in October, 2003.262   
Another impracticality that has been alluded to, but not fully investigated, has been the 
costs incurred by translating all of the documentation presented in court as well as the 
interpretation of the record should it be sent to review by a higher court.  As the 
majority of the reviews in the case-law cited earlier have been sent mid-trial, it is easy 
to see how such delays could impair the administration of justice.  And financial 
resources are scarce in the criminal justice system at the best of times.  An additional, 
and potentially unforeseen, burden on the limited resources of the State may indeed be 
detrimental to the administration of justice. 
 
The problem of practicality was, on the other hand, also examined by the court in 
Pienaar.  The judge found in that case that the State would not be able to meet the 
practicability test if it were to deny the use of Afrikaans in Northen Cape courts where 
72% of cases in those courts were conducted in Afrikaans.263  The costs involved, as 
well as the obligations of parity of languages in s. 6 of the Constitution, would make 
any practicality argument fall as a failure on the part of the Department of Justice to not 
properly support the language needs of the Northern Cape as per their constitutional 
obligations.  Others have argued that the judiciary cannot “hide behind the facade of 
practicability” to allow the continuation of the dominance of English and Afrikaans in 
the judiciary forever leaving African languages under-developed and in an inferior 
position to these languages.264   
 
The issues pertaining to practicality are extremely important considering the burdens 
currently being place on the criminal justice system.  However, to rely on the legacy of 
apartheid and the intentional exclusion of all but white English and Afrikaans-speaking 
professionals from the judiciary is misplaced and not in accordance with the principles 
of advancement and equality of previously disadvantaged languages as well as groups 
and cultures for that matter.265  As the judiciary stands today, it may indeed be 
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impractical to have records written in indigenous languages for the higher courts.  But 
as the judge stated in Mthethwa, those were the circumstances “at present.”266  The 
judiciary, however, is changing and more and more speakers of indigenous languages 
are being appointed to positions in magistrate courts and above.267  Eventually, this 
argument may no longer be valid.  At that point, it will be necessary to re-evaluate the 
impracticality of using African indigenous languages in the country’s courts.  If, 
however, a policy of adopting English as the sole language of record is implemented, it 
may preempt any rights that accused persons would have to a trial in a language that 
they understand.   
 
6. English as the Sole Language of Record 
 It has already been established that the vast majority of accused people standing 
before the country’s magistrates’ courts are speakers of South Africa’s indigenous 
languages.  The majority require interpreters when dealing with a court system that 
functions in English and Afrikaans.  The role of the interpreter varies from court to 
court and may lead to problems caused by the improper expectations on interpreters in 
the courtroom.  We have, however, also looked at the issues of practicability that 
determine whether a person will have a trial in a language that he or she understands or 
have the proceedings interpreted into that language.  We have also established that in 
reality, the only languages for which an interpreter would not necessarily be used are 
English and Afrikaans.  These impracticalities have led courts in two judgments, 
Matomela and Damoyi, to suggest to the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development that to aid in the administration of justice, one language of record should 
be adopted for the entire country, and according to Yekiso, J. in Damoyi, “sanity” 
would point to the English language for such a role.  This proposal has been given its 
approval by the Department; however a judgment against this policy may have delayed 
its implementation.  But is it inevitable? 
 
As it stands at the moment, South Africa’s criminal justice system is still in a state of 
transition where the majority of the actors in the legal system have little to no 
knowledge of the nine official indigenous languages spoken by the majority of their 
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defendants.  This is especially true of the high judiciary, i.e. the High Courts and above, 
where reviews and appeals of magistrate decisions are heard. 
Also, there are incredible cost burdens that all spheres of the public sector are currently 
facing.  These costs may make it prohibitive to interpreting records and translating 
documents used in court. 
 
There has been another advantageous result of South Africa’s constitutional reforms.  
Jurisdictions in other parts of the world are beginning to examine and use jurisprudence 
emanating from the higher courts of South Africa.268 English being the international 
language of trade and commerce would make South African jurisprudence available to 
influence the law in various jurisdictions around the world.269   
 
On the other hand, South Africa has given itself a wide-ranging Bill of Rights 
entrenched in a Constitution that seeks to repair the damage done by colonialism and 
minority rule.  One domain in which the Constitution was particularly broad was the 
development and advancement of its indigenous languages.  Section 6, among the 
founding provisions of the Constitution, puts great responsibility on the part of 
government institutions to promote and advance the use of indigenous languages while 
not derogating from the pre-existing official languages of the country.  The task at hand 
is monumental considering the state of under-development in which indigenous 
languages find themselves, especially when it comes to the language-specific field of 
law.   
 
When applying the Constitution provisions, however, it would appear that the adoption 
of English as the sole language of record would be unconstitutional and therefore 
invalid.  Section 6(1) is very clear when it lists certain indigenous and non-indigenous 
languages as official languages for the country.  Section 6(2) is also clear in the 
imperative that it gives government to take “practical and positive measures” to elevate 
the status and use of indigenous languages.  Is the phrase “practical and positive” 
referring to the practicality problems that the courts have used in order to explain why 
indigenous languages should not be used as languages of record, or is it rather referring 
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to the implementation in practice and positive measures?  The government may have 
the responsibility to use indigenous languages in the practice of government work in 
order to elevate their status and use.   
 
Section 6(3)(a) requires that the national government may use certain languages for the 
functioning of government, but that at least two official languages must be used.  This 
imperative would not allow the government to implement one sole language of record.  
However, this section also gives certain factors that may be taken into consideration 
when deciding which languages to use.  These include usage, practicality, expense, 
regional circumstances and the balancing of the needs and preferences of the local 
population.  Therefore, such a language policy for courts may include English as a 
language of record, but the second language that the government is required to use, 
should reflect the needs and preferences of the population of that High Court division.  
This may be difficult in divisions where a wide range of languages are spoken, but a 
policy that is suited to regional needs would alleviate some of the burden that local 
residents feel when they are in court.   
 
It would appear from the case-law that, besides the language competencies of the 
higher judiciary, expense is the factor that is the most prohibitive in implementing a 
language policy to allow the use of indigenous languages in court.  This cost, however, 
is bound to decrease as more judges and court officers are appointed who speak the 
language of their division.   
 
Lastly, there is the language of s. 35(3)(k) of the Bill of Rights that must be taken into 
consideration.  Accused persons have first, the right to a trial in a language that they 
understand and secondly, a right to interpretation into a language that they understand if 
it is not practicable to conduct the trial in the language.  In order for the interpretation 
to be resorted to, therefore, it is necessary that magistrates can show that it was 
impractical to hold the trial in a language that the accused understands which, even for 
indigenous language speakers, will sometimes be an indigenous language, but 
sometimes not.  Eight out of ten people have their matters settled in lower courts and do 
not have to resort to an appeals process.270  Therefore, for a constitutionally approved 
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fair trial where the majority of accused are unrepresented and the majority speak an 
indigenous language, accused persons should not be barred from having a trial 
conducted in a language that they understand.  In effect, adopting a policy of one sole 
language of record would prevent the majority of accused from having a trial in a 
language that they understand, which would appear not to be the intention of the 
wording of s. 35(3)(k).   
 
Finally, is it appropriate to use the criminal court as an instrument of historical 
reconciliation and advancement?  Should the courts be used to recognize “the 
historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people?”271  If 
indigenous languages are going to enjoy the parity of esteem and equitable treatment to 
which their speakers have a right in s. 6(4) of the Constitution, all spheres of the 
government must reflect the movement towards reconciliation and advancement.  
Removing the courts from this obligation will in fact alienate the majority of people 
who appear before them.  This can have far-reaching social effects as not only does it 
make the court proceedings incomprehensible to the ear, but removes connection of the 
defendant to the law which they are accused of breaking. The effects may be long term 
because “when people do not understand the law or misunderstand it, they are less 
likely to comply with the law or exercise their rights under it.”272  This is disturbing for 
a country that is fresh from conflict and still in a stage of healing.  When an accused’s 
only connection to the law is through an interpreter, their removal from their 
connection may cause the alienation created by minority rule to continue.   
 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
It is therefore submitted that the adoption of English or any other official language as 
the sole language of record is unconstitutional and would limit an indigenous speaker’s 
right to a fair trial if the exercise of proving impracticality of conducting a trial in a 
language which the accused understands without the need for an interpreter was 
removed.  It is not suggested that impracticalities do not exist.  But as seen earlier, the 
dependence on interpreters may not only lead to additional practicality problems in the 
courtroom, but would distance an accused person from the law of their government. 
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It is therefore recommended that instead of advocating for the use of English as the sole 
language of record in the lower courts, the Department of Justice should examine ways 
in which the use of indigenous languages could be incorporated into the court system.  
This may be done by adopting indigenous languages that are widely spoken in a certain 
high court division as languages of the court.  The appointment of judges and 
magistrates in those areas, as well as prosecutors and legal aid board attorneys should 
reflect language use in that area.  In may be necessary to use interpreters in the court of 
certain judges, either for the accused or for the judge him or herself273, but that is the 
situation in which it is appropriate to prove the impracticality of expecting all judges or 
all prosecutors to know all eleven indigenous languages.  But excluding them outright 
as needing interpretation rather than the status as a language of record would be in 
conflict with the imperative provisions of s. 6 of the 1996 Constitution.   
 
The world, however, is turning more and more towards South African jurisprudence.  
This is not a trend that should be discouraged.  Therefore, it would be recommended, as 
Hlophe J. suggested in a radio interview274, that a language of record be adopted for the 
higher courts, such as the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Constitutional Court.  
Section 6(3) requires the use of at least two official languages in all government policy.  
Therefore, English may be adopted as the language of record along side the dominant 
language used in the actual court proceedings.  This would be in conformity with the 
policies of other multilingual developing societies such as China and India.   
 
Interpretation remains an important element in every courtroom of the country.  It is 
hoped, however, that with the adoption of a policy that allows the use of indigenous 
languages in the courtroom, the resources normally allocated to interpreters may be 
used for translation services of documents and records.  South Africa’s transition has 
come a long way, but trends toward restrictive interpretation of language rights may not 
permit the reconciliation of a non-racial society upon which the Constitution is based.  
Removing the majority of accused from the court process by imposing a language 
barrier will continue to give the impression of a foreign legal system in one’s own 
country.  This removal will not ensure the value of human dignity and advancement of 
human rights that all South African are guaranteed by their Constitution.   
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